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Abstract  
 The article is a research on Chinese Political Economy, dealing about 
Renminbi Internationalization and its effects on Hong Kong Stock Exchange. 
In the article I went through the step conducted by Chinese government to 
internationalize its currency. Then tried to analyze real Chinese intentions 
and actions, examining indexes of Hong Kong market to understand what are 
the effects on Hong Kong finance market. Hong Kong is an ideal stage to 
measure perceptions of benefits underpinned to Renminbi (RMB) 
internationalization. In fact Hong Kong is part of People’s Republic of China 
as a Special Administrative Region and benefits from this situation, having 
particular political and economic autonomies. In particular Hong Kong has 
its own currency and political economy and can deal with Chinese economy 
from the particular position of an external insider. Hong Kong is also the first 
market where have been issued bonds in Renminbi and is probably going to 
become the most affected economy from the internationalization. I 
conducted an analysis of possible real benefits (or negative effects) that 
Hong Kong and its population could have from an internationalized RMB 
taking in account effects of Chinese step toward Internationalization on 
Hong Kong finance market. In conducting my research I found out four steps 
particularly representatives of RMB internationalization, for each step I 
analyzed Hong Kong financial market behavior and I tried to assess the 
effects of a definitive RMB Internationalization. I finally tried to conclude if 
process has to be considered and advantage or disadvantage for Hong Kong 
and what could be better actions for Special Administrative Region to take in 
order to avoid or diminish possible negative effects of RMB 
Internationalization process. 
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Introduction 
 While the world is facing the end of the economic crisis started in 
2008, financial crisis is probably not near to a resolution. The European 
Union is still under a negative finance situation. China is protagonist of a 
positive recovery from the crisis finance crisis started in 2009 and has 
consolidated its role of second world economy (even with a revised GDP). 
The People’s Republic of China policy of Renminbi Internationalization has 
made big progress from 2009 onward, probably also because PRC and 
People’s Bank of China are trying to take advantage from impasse caused on 
US Dollar and Euro from the crisis. Internationalization of Chinese currency 
it’s having and will have huge effects on Hong Kong HUB (one of the 
principal Stock Market worldwide). 
 In the first part of the article I summed up an history of RMB 
Internationalization policy illustrating it trough principal Chinese actions and 
strategies. In the second part of the article I listed the effects of Chinese step 
toward RMB Internationalization on Hong Kong Stock Exchange (either if 
planned or not from PBoC). Finally in third part I tried to understand the real 
intentions of PBoC (is China willing to Internationalize RMB in short terms? 
What are the risks?). 
 I finally analyzed what Hong Kong should expect in term of effects 
on its HKSE in the near future, concluding if RMB Internationalization in 
short term will be positive or negative for that market. I even suggested what 
should be better steps for Hong Kong Political Economy in order to avoid 
Internationalization negative effects. For my analysis I used a comparative 
methodology: I collected official data from Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
website (Hong Kong Stock Exchange, Annual Fact Book, 2000-2014, from 
https://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/index.htm) and from specialized print editions 
(newspaper Il sole 24 ore, daily editions 2009-2014). I selected data starting 
from four principal steps that are considered China main steps in Currency 
Internationalization road by literature. By this selection data are taken from 
different periods for each step analyzed: as an example the 
Internationalization of dim sum bond market started in 2010, so I considered 
data from 2010 to 2015. I tried to read from data taken the HKSE behavior in 
term of gain and loss and so to interpret if the road to Internationalization is 
carrying positive or negative effects on Honk Kong’s Political Economy. 
 
Renminbi Internationalization: 
 First steps. At the end of 2003 Central Bank of China started to work 
toward RMB internationalization and in 2004 China started to allow border 
trading of money, especially through Southern and Western border. Since 
that date Chinese Central Bank started a policy to apt and adapt its money to 
be exchanged in International markets (Eichengreen & Kawai, 2015). In fact 
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internationalize a money is the process through which a State and its Central 
Bank get its currency apt to be used (exchanged and available to Foreign 
Direct Investments) outside its borders. 
 The first step took place in 2000 with the Chiang Mai Initiative and 
the signing of the bilateral agreement between the ASEAN countries and the 
three East Asian Major economies: South Korea, China and Japan. Most of 
the exchanges planned by the treaties were effected in US dollars, but some 
of them also in RMB (Otero-Iglesias, 2011). An amount of analysts consider 
one of the first motivations to start the process a consequence of the great 
financial Asian crisis of 1997-8. This crisis was caused by the opening of 
Thailand financial market to foreign investments. These investments were 
mostly speculative, as they were realized in order to earn a short-term profit 
on interest rate differences, and lead to market instability through economic 
bubbles. Thailand Central Bank couldn’t manage to control the speculative 
flow and asset prices joined an unsustainable level. These asset prices finally 
began to collapse, resulting in panic among lenders and investors. This 
situation took to a sudden withdraw of liquidity and a credit crunch. The 
crisis caused GDP growth rates to fall rapidly, bankrupting of companies 
overexposed to foreign-currency risk, and eventually necessitating costly and 
politically humiliating IMF-led bailouts. Critical situation spread from 
Thailand to the other Asian countries, and at the end was solved with the 
help of Chinese economy that renouncing to its strong exporting country role 
made most hit economies starting recover. 
 One of the lessons perceived from the 1997-8 crisis was that Asian 
countries couldn’t rely on the Western financial institutions (IMF and IRBM) 
and they had to develop their own system and a second lesson was that China 
acted as a leading economy of these institutions.  
 So we can affirm that China around 2000 years started to conceive its 
role of hegemonic regional economy to understand that internationalized 
money was one of the first step to fulfill this role.  
 Main benefits that China could obtain from the Renminbi 
internationalization are 1) To reduce the change risk for Chinese enterprises  
operating abroad,  for example in European market (Fox & Godement, 
2009). 2) To incentivize and sustain Chinese FDI outflows (Kang, 2007) 3) 
To enter its currency in the official basket of currencies used to quote the 
SDR, actually China would need this capability  to play a bigger role in the 
International Political Economy obtaining a greater autonomy in 
international monetary affairs. 
 First and second points have become more and more important 
starting from 2005 (Zhu, 2008), when China increases its interests in trading 
with European economies. Particularly China, as a lot of analysis suggest,  
(Gabusi & Andornino, 2012) established with EU a number of “asymmetric 
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competions” in market. China and Chinese enterprises used basically three 
tactics to operate in EU markets (Fox & Godement, 2009). First is to take 
advantage of differences between its own centralized authority and the EU’s 
rules-based system. In fact, China makes full use of the openness of EU 
markets while using fragmentation of its own administrative channels is able 
to restrict access (even with non-tariff barriers) to its own market to the 
European Union firms (Fox & Godement, 2009). The internationalization of 
RMB would make Chinese firms gain the confidence of European States (for 
having liquidity in internationalized currencies) but they actually wouldn’t 
maintain the protection of the political Chinese apparatus.  
 Second Chinese tactic is based in assuring EU on its opening to 
questions as general human rights and opening to market economies, in 
effect, as quoted from Fox and Godement “EU hails as a great victory the 
opening to human rights dialogue with China” (Fox & Godement, 2009). A 
bigger victory for EU and Western markets in general will be, at the same 
way, the perception of opening to finance markets realized with RMB 
internationalization.  
 Third factor used by China would be to have a strong and 
international currency and autonomous monetary policy, renouncing fixed 
rates of exchange.  
 Third point to examine is the Chinese awareness of importance of 
Renminbi entrance in the “club” of currencies used by IMF to quote SDR. 
This basket encompasses Euro, US dollar, Sterling pound and Japanese Yen. 
The currency value of the SDR is determined by summing the value in US 
dollars of the currencies of this basket. IMF and generally international 
finance system recognize the currencies of the basket as the “major 
currencies” (IMF, 2015). Being part of the basket is fundamental for major 
economies currencies for having an immediate quotation in SDR. China 
realized to be one of the leading economy and its need to be part, with RMB 
as major currency, of IMF system after the 1997-1998 crisis, with its 
entrance in WTO in 2001 and during Hu Jintao Era (Breslin, 2010). In fact in 
2009 China Central Bank Governor, Zhou, started to talk about SDR in a 
relevant contribution appeared in People’s Bank of China website. He, 
quoting Keynes and Triffin, enounced possibility of transforming SDR in a 
super national reserve currency, used to give liquidity decided by IMF and 
administrated with a clear corpus of rules. This particular kind of use of SDR 
could have taken to overpass US dollar (money used for IMF operations). 
Zhou’s idea naturally, even if evaluated by a UN’s commission wasn’t 
approved, but, if read as an expression of Chinese thoughts about the 
balances of currencies in IMF, it’s a signal that China and Chinese officials 
understood the new role of their economy and their currency. China need an 
international Renminbi to be in a directive position in the finance world. 
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Chinese position in financial community has then become much more 
important after the 2008 International crisis and a partial “erosion” of US 
dollar role (Eichengreen, 2009). In fact, one of the effect of International 
finance crisis has been the weakened role of America economy and US 
Dollar, that left space for a new strong currency, that currency could be, 
completing its internationalization by 2016, the Chinese Renminbi. On the 
one hand from 2008 date China started to potentiate their reserve to prepare 
Renminbi to enter in the International currency market as a strong currency 
and to accelerate the pace for RMB internationalization, on the other hand, 
Western countries investors started a series of speculative attack to Chinese 
markets either just with speculative purposes or more broadly, to defend their 
market and currencies from imminent internationalization of a strong new 
currency. In any case, as economic reforms process started with Deng an 
proceeded steadily and almost monotonically until Hu Era, China is going to 
join the aim of Renminbi internationalization by next years and, road map to 
arrive to that date has been really interesting and dense of events until 
present days.   
 Actions toward an RMB Internationalization. As we have seen in 
2004 Chinese government started to allow cross border money trading (first 
step toward the currency internationalization). Political opinions on RMB 
internationalization are generally positive either for neoliberal thought 
(Eichengreen, 2015) and non-liberal thought (Subacchi,2015)  . In effect 
even recent scholarship suggests that this positive view is right. One of t 
conventional view is that there can only be one international reserve 
currency at a point in time. Recent historical scholarship shows, to the 
contrary, that several international currencies have regularly coexisted. If we 
analyze the currencies History, The unconventional period from this point of 
view is the second half of the 20th century, to use different words, the 
“Washington Consensus Era”: an era when only the US possessed deep and 
liquid financial markets open to the rest of the world and, consequently, the 
dollar was the lonely and really International Country. 
 But there is no reason why, in the circumstances of the 21st century, 
the dollar and the RMB could not both play major global roles. There is no 
reason why the US should continue to possess a monopoly in international 
finance without starting another International financial crisis (Eichengreen & 
Kawai 2015). 
 Of course, the same arguments suggesting that two currencies can 
share the international stage at a point in time also admit the possibility of 
more than two international currency (another candidate could be Euro). 
Despite of this theory, as we will see, from 2010 onward there have been two 
speculative attack to Chinese markets from Western investors probably 
related to the internationalizing policy of China Central Bank. 
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 A first acceleration in the project was made with the creation of “dim 
sum bond market”. The definition “dim sum bond” generally is related to 
RMB-denominated bonds issued in Hong Kong. The majority of dim sum 
bond are denominated in CNH, but some are linked to RMB and quoted in 
that currency. In July 2007, dim sum bonds worth a total of US$657 million 
were issued for the first time by China Development Bank. These bonds 
were issued to foreign investors in Renminbi, for first time, rather than the 
local currencies. 
 In June 2010, China allowed Financial Institutions in Hong Kong to 
issue dim sum bonds. HSBC was the first foreign credit Institute that issued 
RMB Bond (dim sum bond). In August 2010, the American McDonald was 
the first corporate that issued dim sum bonds. In October, the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), became the first supranational agency who 
issued dim sum bond and also the first dim sum bond listed in HKSE. The 
dim sum bonds market grew 2.3 times from 2010 to 2013, with an amount at 
the end of 2013 of 310 billion of RMB (Artus & Xu, 2014). 
 One of the biggest evolution was in August 2012, in that year China 
and Taiwan signed an memorandum of understanding on new cross-strait 
currency settlement and in March 2013, China Trust Commercial Bank 
became the first to issue RMB bonds in Taiwan market (known as Formosa 
bond). Political issues were overpassed for PRC needing to internationalize 
RMB.  
 Another important series of action taken from China was the 2008 
Cross-Border Trade RMB Settlement Pilot Project on 24 December 2008. 
China allowed import and export in RMB between Yunnan province and 
countries in GMS including ASEAN countries, Guangdong province, Hong 
Kong and Macau. 
 Then on 1 July 2009, China officially announced regulation on RMB 
Settlement Pilot Project and opened up Shanghai and 4 cities in Guangdong 
(Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Dongguan) with Hong Kong, Macau and 
ASEAN countries. 
 By 2014, RMB cross-border trade settlement reached RMB 5.9 
trillion making a 42.6% (YoY) increase, which represent 22% of China's 
trading volume. 
 Third Chinese step toward a future currency internationalization 
started in 2009: since that year China has signed currency swap agreements 
with numerous countries such as Argentina, Belarus, Brazil, Canada, ECB, 
Hong Kong, Iceland, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, 
Thailand, the United Kingdom and Uzbekistan. The Renminbi deposits in 
Hong Kong gradually grow up and become 59 billion in  2009. 
 In June 2013, first country of G7 to start an official currency swap 
line with China was United Kingdom, that event was an official 
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acknowledgement of the Chinese third step through currency 
internationalization. 
 As of 2014, the RMB is the 7th most traded currency in the world 
while US Dollar remains the First one (with 41% of transactions in USD). 
(IMF, 2015). 
 Finally the fourth macro-step in RMB Internationalization was taken 
from China in 2013: the opening of Shanghai Free Trade Zone (SFTZ). 
The SFTZ was launched on 29 September 2013 with key implementation 
details announcing in 2014. The SFTZ is being used as a test ground for 
trade, investment and financial reforms, before the complete extension 
nationwide. The RMB can flow freely between Free Trade Account (FTA), 
non-resident onshore account and offshore account. Transactions between 
resident onshore account outside SFTZ and FTA with the same entity are 
also allowed provided they do not involve capital account transactions that 
are not yet approved by People’s Bank of China (PBoC) and SAFE 
(Eichengreen & Kawai, 2015). United Kingdom finance immediately 
showed its interest in project sending an Expert task force in Shanghai and a 
large number of British financial services provider started to operate in 
Shanghai.   
 Notwithstanding the actions taken from China road to the RMB 
Internationalization is far from complete. History suggests that economic 
stability in the form of low inflation, small budget deficits and stable growth 
is also important. China’s record of supportive government policies and 
macro-economic stability has undoubtedly contributed to the RMB’s appeal 
in recent years but probably Chinese economy is not yet enough stable to 
risk a RMB Internationalization (Subacchi 2015). 
 In addiction a deep, open and well-regulated capital markets are 
necessary so the currency can be used to finance trade as well as provide a 
large enough market in securities for investors. The opening up of China’s 
onshore capital market will be an important step in the RMB becoming a 
major investment currency. For the RMB to be a truly global and become a 
more widely held reserve currency there needs to be greater access for 
foreign investors to local capital markets, even deeper global RMB liquidity 
and wider cross-border flow channels. But one time PBoC will have 
established these conditions, it should have the instruments to defend its 
markets from external speculation (in order to avoid 1997-1998 Thailand 
crisis outcomes). 
 While, on the one hand the scholars see, in general, the RMB 
Internationalization, positively, on the other hand that step will open Chinese 
markets to speculation. We already assisted to a double speculative attack in 
partially opened markets.  
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 A double attack was conducted in 2010 and 2013 and could be read 
as an attack to China policy for currency Internationalization or a preemptive 
attack to taste speculative possibilities (Aveline-Dubach, 2013). We assisted 
to a speculative bubbles on real estate markets in China that took to an 
unjustified overestimation of properties in some areas controlled by foreign 
investors. 
 Effects of Internationalization in Hong Kong. Hong Kong is a 
particular case of a mixed sovereignty state from 30th July 1997: when Great 
Britain governor abandoned the British colony. The return of Hong Kong 
under Chinese sovereignty marked the success of Deng’s concept of “one 
country, two systems” and combined the Chinese Communist Party control 
on Foreign Affairs Political (International Policy) aspect and Defense with a 
large autonomy in Internal Politics and Political Economy, maintaining its 
own currency, financial market and autonomous political choices.  
Hong Kong remains one of  the biggest finance market and it has been a sort 
of access for Chinese investors to International finance markets.   
 I will try to examine effect of the four macro-steps realized by PRC 
on Hong Kong stock market (with data taken from official sources), then I 
will try to conclude if those effects could be replicable in case of a definitive 
Chinese currency internationalization for Hong Kong stock markets or not 
and what could be the effects of a real, definitive RMB internationalization 
on Hong Kong finance market. 
 Chiang Mai initiative started in 2000 with the negotiation for a series 
of bilateral swap agreements, even if Hong Kong entered in the agreements 
just in April 2009. Hong Kong contributed to the currency reserve with a 
monetarization of 19,2 US $ contribution and its liquidity was summed to the 
one of PRC though Hong Kong remained a sovereign administration in its 
own. That event represented an advantage either for PRC because China 
doubled its contribution (precedent was 19,2 US $) and Hong Kong for it 
joined Chinese economy being part of an far bigger economy even if it 
partially lost its autonomy. In April 2000, also because the newborn Hong 
Kong finance market (really autonomous from 1997) wasn’t affected from 
start of negotiation and it didn’t register any major effect (HKEX, 2000-
2014). In fact Hong Kong wasn’t involved in Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) if 
not partially until 2009. First agreements between China and Hong Kong 
were signed in April and on 8 April, HKEx and the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange entered into a Closer Cooperation Agreement. In the same month 
Hong Kong signed a Memorandum Of Understanding with State Securities 
Commission of Vietnam to strengthen their cooperation in cross border 
capital movements control. That happened for the new Chinese and Hong 
Kong orientation toward capital and currency internationalization. In June 
HSBC Holdings started (as first no-mainland China Bank) to issue Renminbi 
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(RMB) bonds in Hong Kong, with an issue of RMB1 billion (HK$1.1 
billion) bonds by its Mainland branch to institutional investors. For first I 
examine the principal index of trading: the Hang Seng. The Hang Seng Index 
(HSI) reached its highest level of the year at 22,943 points on 16 November 
2009 and closed the year at 21,872 points, 52% higher than the previous 
year’s closing. At the end of 2009, the Hang Seng China Enterprises Index 
(H-shares Index) increased year-on-year by 62%, closing at 12,794 points. 
The Hang Seng China-Affiliated Corporations Index ended the year at 4,059 
points, a year-on-year increase of 23%. That happened despite 2009 was 
immediately successive to the 2008 crisis effect. Considering Graphic 1 we 
can better assess the immediate recovery of Hong Kong finance market from 
crisis effects. 
 
Graphic 1 Hang Seng Index value last day of the year (2007-2009) 
 
 Immediate recovery from crisis, due to new trust given to Hong Kong 
market, especially if compared with Euro countries was probably effect of 
RMB area swap agreements. A general progress in crisis response was made 
thank to Chinese dimension of the Hong Kong market, and was helped by 
the swap agreements (HKE, 2009). 
 In Graphic 2 are reported monthly closing indexes, and we can better 
highlight the changing point of negative HS index was April, when 
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agreements were sign
 
Graphic 2 Hang Seng Index value last day of the month (2009). 
 
 From Graphic 2 is clear that growth of the index start after 
agreements date and keep on until the end of the year (apart from August 
flexion due to the closing period of some international  markets for 
Summer). 
 Another really interesting index to consider is the China Enterprises 
Share reported in Graphic 3. 
Graphic 3 China Enterprises share in the year (2005-2009). 
  
 Chinese Enterprises represent biggest group of enterprises listed in 
Hong Kong market and are an huge resource of capitalization. RMB swap 
agreements are a mean to facilitate Chinese Enterprises in Hong Kong and 
we can assess the importance of the agreements considering the increase in 
number of Chinese Enterprises operating in Hong Kong. In fact Chinese 
Enterprise passed from 80 in 2005 to 95 in 2006, going to 104 2007 and to 
110 in 2008 to arrive at 116 in 2009, after the agreements. From Graphic 3 
we can notice that shared increased starting from 2007. This effect was 
probably created from Chinese Institutions (PBoC) to prepare the Hong 
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Kong market for the agreements and to better convince Hong Kong 
government in signing them. A positive aspect of increased number of 
Mainland Enterprises in Hong Kong is the liquidity taken from China to the 
market.  
 There is evidence that Chinese swap agreements to prepare their 
currency internationalization resulted in a series of positive immediate 
effects for Hong Kong. In fact Hong Kong market lost partially its autonomy 
to gain an huge liquidity and a number of Chinese finance investors. 
 The creation of some international “dim sum bond” markets is 
another important indicator for RMB internationalization effects on Hong 
Kong market. China gave permission to Hong Kong financial Institution to 
issue bonds in RMB in June 2010. Regional actors accepted this possibility 
and even if offshore RMB issuing is still modest, (just 2% of all global trade 
settled in Chinese currency and a low 0.3% of all notes and bonds 
denominated in RMB in 2013) but expansion of its use will almost certainly 
continue as suggested from analysts: for example from J. Ciorciari in “Asian 
Survey” (J. Ciorciari, 2014). In Graphic 3 is reported the dim sum bond 
market growth from 2010 to 2014, considered in term of dim sum bond s 
issuance (value expressed in US dollars at the issuance day). We can 
immediately notice the growth year per year from 2010 to 2013 at a pace of 
some percent points. In 2013 we witnesses an increase of 49,6 % and from 
2013 to 2014 to an explosive increase of more than 100%.  
Graphic 4 Dim sum bonds issuance (2010-2014). 
 
 On the one hand the dramatic increase in dim sum bonds market 
represent an immediate advantage for Hong Kong Exchange by the fact that 
more than 50% of that bonds are issued in Hong Kong. On the other hand it 
exposes Hong Kong Exchange to a number of risks linked to speculative 
bubbles. Hong Kong market is, in a certain sense, used as an experimental 
stage from PRC (Frankel, 2012), in realizing and testing economic and 
finance acts. 
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 Concerning the Cross-Border Trade, started in December 2008, Hong 
Kong has been newly one of the first country involved and with an huge 
amount of finance traffic. By 2014, RMB cross-border trade settlement 
reached RMB 5.9 trillion making a 42.6% and became 22% of total Chinese 
trading. Generally speaking, Renminbi deposits in Hong Kong are an 
enormous amount of liquidity available to Hong Kong banks and Institute 
and are an important part in making its market the most important Asia 
market. Cross-border trade of currency followed an incremental trend from 
2010 to 2014 in Graphic 5 are shown the trade settlement realized in Hong 
Kong with Chinese currency. 
  
Graphic 5 Renminbi trade settlement in Hong Kong billion RMB value per year. 
 
 Hong Kong is the first market offshore for Renminbi trade and trade 
settlement in RMB in 2014 have been almost the same in Hong Kong than in 
Mainland China. Therefore China push to realize much more cross-border 
traffic in Renminbi has caused an impressive increase of Hong Kong market 
trade volume.  
 The forth step of the road to RMB internationalization is the creation 
of Free Trade Zone (SFTZ). The SFTZ was launched on 29 September 2013 
with key implementation details announcing in 2014. The SFTZ is being 
used as a test ground before the complete extension of economic reform to 
the whole Mainland China. As an example in SFTZ are not applied tariffs 
otherwise present in Mainland China. SFTZ has been seen by many analysts 
as a try of China to build a HUB competing with Hong Kong market 
(Subacchi, 2015; ). Notwithstanding fear of completion between the two 
zones if we analyze, for example, data regarding Renminbi funds deposited 
in Hong Kong, shown in Graphic 6. 
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Graphic 6 Renminbi funds in Hong Kong billion RMB value per year. 
 
 We can immediately notice that even if in 2013 has been started and 
promoted the new Mainland China HUB (SFTZ), instead than decrease, the 
number of RMB funds in Hong Kong has grown sensibly. The effect is even 
a natural consequence of presence of a large number of Chinese Enterprises 
operating in SFTZ in HKE. SFTZ rather than being a finance market 
competitor of Hong Kong is a zone of economic reform whose Enterprises 
operate in Hong Kong Finance Market (Haibin, Z., Grace G., Lu J., 2014). 
Furthermore, through the Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect (created in 
2014 by the Chinese Prime Minister Le Keqiang), Hong Kong and 
international investors are able to invest in eligible shares listed on the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange, and Chinese investors can invest in eligible 
shares listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange directly. Thank to this new 
channel Chinese Enterprises are facilitated in investing in Hong Kong and 
has been created a link between SFTZ and Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
 Real Chinese (and PBoC) orientations. If we consider the growth 
of the two major stock exchanges in China, Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) 
and the less important Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE), the 
internationalization could be considered as an idea already present in PBoC 
behavior from 2000. 
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ont the domestic market capitalization in USD millions in January 2014, the 
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NYSE (17 006 535.4) e la NASDAQ OMX (5 997 512.8), the two most 
important American stock exchange, are the first and the second position in 
the international ranking, but the SSE (2 414 391.4) and the  SZSE (1 510 
124.8) have the sixth and tenth place. 
 If SEE will reach the same level as the Hong Kong Exchanges, fifth 
in the international ranking, there will be a significant alteration of balance, 
as the most important stock exchanges in Asia would be Chinese, 
incrementing the RMB key role at the international role. Whereas now, 
Tokyo and Singapore still have a higher domestic  market capitalization. So, 
even if China tried to build strength in its markets, generally, Renminbi 
needs a more effective capitalization. 
 The PBoC, in charge of Internationalization process, consists of 18 
functional departments (bureaus) and in particular General Administration 
Department (in charge of political affairs) and Monetary Policy Department 
(in charge of Monetary Policy). PBoC has never used officially the word 
“Internationalization”, even if it is speaking about a progressive opening of 
markets from 2004 onward (Eichengreen & Kawai, 2015). On the one hand 
there are evidence of Chinese reinforcement of their financial markets, on the 
other hand there are not initiatives involving the whole Chinese territory (in 
term of cross border exchange) and markets (in terms of global swap 
agreements). While the political level (General Administration Department) 
could benefit in term of soft power policy and general opening to liberal 
system (Cheng, 2013), there are not evidences that Chinese economy could 
be able to sustain a currency Internationalization as many analyst declare 
(Fu, 2015). We can say that while Dollar is the first currency for use (41% of 
transactions), Renminbi, despite the huge Chinese Economy, doesn’t actually 
need an International dimension before increasing its real circulation (still at 
1,47%), speaking in term of Political Economy, at the same time, speaking in 
term of Economic Policy, China would need a more International image, that 
could pass through an International currency. 
 
Conclusion  
 There are evidences that for Hong Kong Stock Exchange the 
Renminbi Internationalization is going to cause an increase in trading, capital 
flow and capital accumulation. I highlighted how Renminbi swap agreement 
and Renminbi cross-border traffic increased the volume of trading in Hong 
Kong and the number of Chinese Enterprises in that Market. Furthermore 
China created a deposit of RMB to increase liquidity of Hong Kong banks 
and Hong Kong participation to the swap agreements. Hong Kong’s Hang 
Seng Index has had dramatic increase, as an example on May 2015 after 
China made it easier for mainland funds to use the cross-border link to buy 
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stocks, energizing newly the Hong Kong Market and linking more to the 
world’s second-largest economy. 
 Dim Sum Bonds Market has become an important part of Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange to the extent that Hong Kong has become the principal 
issuer of the RMB bonds, and is giving to Hong Kong the principal role in a 
market in rapid expansion. 
 Even SFTZ, as I stressed in the last part of text is going to be a 
resource other than a disadvantage for Hong Kong Stock Exchange. To sum 
up there will be no short term negative effect in a Chinese currency 
Internationalization.  
 On the one hand a RMB internationalized would cause a huge 
increase of capital flow in HKSE, on the other hand is going to expose Hong 
Kong to an excessive linkage with China (diminishing its autonomy in 
Political Economy) and to the excessive growth risks (as speculative 
bubbles).   
 Especially if China has not yet the real intention of Internationalize 
its 
currency in a relatively short term (as I suggest in the very last part of my 
text) Hong Kong operators should avoid to concentrate their investment 
solely in Chinese capitals, bonds and enterprises. In fact basing every 
investment on Chinese currency will expose too much Hong Kong to an 
experimental stage (that is, at this moment, the RMB Internationalization) 
eligible to all the risk of an experiments and not yet solid.   
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